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1 INTRODUCTION
Contemporary changes in the global order point out topics like 
inter-regionalism, maritime security and South-South cooperation 
that represent an important research field to understand the new 
inter-regional dynamics. The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the 
South Atlantic – ZPCAS (Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico 
Sul – ZOPACAS), emerges within a context of end of a bipolar 
world in which the South-South cooperation is intensified.
Created in 1986 by the United Nations General Assembly reso-
lution 41/11, ZOPACAS arises from a Brazilian initiative, suppor-
ted by Argentina, Nigeria and Angola. Presently it comprises 24 
member countries and meets a regional demand to secure an 
environment free of external threats.1  The agreement foresees the 
“necessity to preserve the region from militarization measures, the 
arms race, the presence of foreign military bases and, above all, 
nuclear weapons” (UNITED NATIONS, 1986).2
Since its beginning, there have been seven Ministerial Meetings: 
Rio de Janeiro (1988), Abuja (1990), Brasilia (1994), Somerset 
West (1996), Buenos Aires (1998), Luanda (2007) and Montevideo 
(2013). In every meeting, the Brazilian strategy was characterized 
by an effort to define a regime of political coordination. All in all, 
it was “the manifestation of the African-Atlantic heritage and it 
1  ZOPACAS is composed of South Africa, Angola, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, 
Cape Verde, Cameroun, Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, São Tomé e Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leoa, 
Togo, and Uruguay. 
2  The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was founded in June, 1996 by China, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Its main purpose is 
military cooperation to fight against terrorism, separatism, and extremism, even 
though they also deal with issues of economic and cultural cooperation.  
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resulted in its assertion as the operational code for all the member 
countries of that Zone” (PENHA, 2011, p. 219).
ZOPACAS cooperation in the Defense field has as its main 
objective  avoiding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
reducing – or completely eliminating – the military presence of 
alien forces in the region. In a broad context, the countries that 
are part of it seek ways of integration starting from economic, 
commercial, and technical-scientific cooperation, emphasizing, 
in the case of Brazil, the policies of technical cooperation and of 
investments beginning with the activities of Embrapa to foster 
agricultural production; Petrobras’ incentive to S&T; financing of 
infrastructure through the National Bank for Economic and Social 
Development (BNDES); and  collaboration between the Brazilian 
Navy (Marinha do Brasil - MB) and the governments of Angola and 
Namibia, in order to map and explore the ocean floor, and survey 
its continental shelves.
2 GEOPOLITICAL THREATS AND CHALLENGES IN THE 
SOUTH ATLANTIC
Brazilian prominence in the constitution of ZOPACAS did not 
come from a power vacuum, but it appeared in a context of conflict 
with players of the region and others from outside. The founding 
of ZOPACAS itself, within the scope of the UN, received support of 
124 member States, but it met resistance from European countries 
like Germany, Belgium, France, Holland, Italy, Luxembourg and 
Portugal that, like Japan, decided to abstain from voting. The 
United States was the only member State voting against the 
resolution. Their fear was due to the fact that this resolution might 
cause difficulty for the freedom of navigation of those countries in 
the South Atlantic.
Brazilian presence in Africa arises as a high level geopolitical 
movement, capable of changing the power play in the Continent, 
that so far had been an almost exclusive area for European 
exploitation. Under strong objection from the USA, as a reaction 
to the Brazilian political projection in South America and Africa 
and by the competition with the Brazilian defense industry in 
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some markets, Brazil´s prominence in the South Atlantic zone is 
manifested in various aspects. An important element in Brazilian 
strategy becomes evident in the domestic effort to link programs 
of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in defense. Brazil signed 
a number of agreements  of cooperation in defense with Namibia 
(1994), Cape Verde (1994), South Africa (2003), Guinea-Bissau 
(2006), Mozambique (2009), Nigeria (2010), Senegal (2010), Angola 
(2010), and Equatorial Guinea (2010 e 2013).  Since 2012, joint 
military exercises are carried out with the Navy of Benin, Cape 
Verde, Nigeria and São Tomé e Príncipe and additional exercises 
with Angola, Mauritania, Namibia and Senegal. In 2013 Brazil 
implemented another Brazilian naval  mission, in Cape Verde. 
In several countries, Brazil is the main equipment supplier and 
a partner in military training.  According to Abdenur and Souza 
Neto these actions “aim at strenghtening the maritime identity of 
the countries of the South Atlantic perimeter, stressing not only 
their common concerns, but also their perception of the need to 
protect oceanic resources on both sides of the South Atlantic, 
especially the pre-salt area.”   (ABDENUR; SOUZA NETO, 2014, 
p.18).  Such movement was followed by the strong Chinese entry 
in that continent. The American military offensive in the continent 
was an answer to it.
Chinese growth increased the country´s demand for energy and 
commodities. The Chinese presence in Africa in search of natural 
resources was intensified from 2005 on, when approximately one 
thousand companies were established and hundreds of thousands 
of Chinese workers went to different countries. In 2009, China 
surpassed the United States as Africa´s largest trading partner. 
In December 2015, during the conference for the Forum of China-
Africa Cooperation (Fórum de Cooperação China-África - FOCAC), 
in Johannesburg, the Chinese president Xi Jinping announced an 
investment package of US$ 60 billion in various African countries 
in 2016. The package placed the Chinese energy companies in a 
position that allowed competition with the large multinational 
companies like Exxon Mobil and Shell, directly interfering with the 
American interests in the region.
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Oil geopolitics will undergo significant changes in the next 
decade. According to  the ex-president of Petrobras, Armando 
Guedes Coelho, in 2025, Brazil will produce an expressive volu-
me of barrels of oil with the pre-salt, followed by  a high produc-
tion from Angola and Nigeria. This will happen simultaneously to 
the reduction of imports of the product by the United States, with 
China becoming the largest importer of Middle East oil. Guedes 
has also anticipated that China will increase oil and gas imports 
around 40% (FUTURA…, 2013). Every geopolitical change of the 
same proportion has clear implications for regional defense.
In his intervention at the plenary session during the last meeting 
in Montevideo, in 2013, Defense minister Celso Amorim stressed 
the need to consolidate and extend defense cooperation among 
member countries, asserting that “Nowadays we live a reality that 
makes it difficult to say exactly where, how, and what will be the 
external interventions of conflicts that might arise.” (BRASIL, 2013).
Surveillance in the South Atlantic is fragile. The scrapping of 
naval ships facilitates illegal smuggling activities, piracy (so far 
not yet identified in the region) and illegal fishing. The limitations 
of the war navies of the countries in this zone are explicit. Even 
the Brazilian navy, the largest one among member countries, 
has serious limitations. Even though the project of the Brazilian 
nuclear submarine is underway, there is increasing international 
greed toward recent discoveries of significant oil reserves in the 
Brazilian pre-salt layer and there is the rise of Nigeria and Angola, 
the two biggest producers of oil on the African side, the last one 
counting on the expressive presence of Brazilian workers and 
companies linked to the mining, oil, and civil engineering sectors 
(JORGE, 2011). Therefore, the sea linking the Brazilian oil reserves 
of the Brazilian pre-salt layer to the region of the Gulf of Guinea 
becomes a new area of geostrategic importance to the Northern 
powers, being considered a potential global supplier of the oil that 
used to come from the Persian Gulf. The National Defense Strategy 
(Estratégia Nacional de Defesa - END) relates the South Atlantic, 
together with the Amazon Region, the two most important regions 
from a strategic point of view, making use of cooperation with 
neighbor countries whenever necessary (BRASIL, 2008).
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The lack of capacity of the countries to provide surveillance to 
their territorial seas stimulates the continuous presence of coun-
tries like England, that holds a considerable number of territories in 
the South Atlantic, a remnant of its colonial rule.  The continental 
shelves of the countries in the region necessarily pass through the 
British territorial waters. England holds sovereignty over islands 
and archipelagoes throughout the South Atlantic. Among the most 
controversial territories are the   Falkland Islands (Ilhas Malvinas), 
scene of a war in 1982, and of diplomatic tensions   between the 
governments of Cristina Kirchner and David Cameron in 2015 
related to England´s claim to oil exploration in the region.
The interventionist pretensions of military instruments such 
as US Africa Command (AFRICOM), created in 2007, make use of 
security strategies to control “empty spaces”, like the Sahel, on the 
grounds that locations that have not yet been used by global terror-
ist groups may be used as spaces for mobilization and training3 
(BERNARDINO, 2015, p.180). In addition, the reactivation of the U.S. 
Fourth Fleet by the USA, that happened one year after AFRICOM, 
uses the argument of security cooperation and fight against terror-
ism as a pretext. Interventionist actions camouflaged as process-
es of asymmetrical cooperation  arouse distrust in African and 
South American governments. According to the Brazilian Defense 
Minister’s words “The absence of immediate military threats does 
not justify thoughtlessness regarding the possibility that we may 
be affected by crises with an impact on defense and security, even 
against our will” (AMORIM, 2012).  The minister ponders that, “due 
to the fluidity of international relations, we have to be prepared 
for a potential external threat and build a strong defense industry 
as part of a strategy of dissuasion that ensures peace in the South 
Atlantic” (AMORIM, 2012). 
3 The “Pan-Sahel” initiative was “an effort led by the USA to help Mali, Niger, 
Chad, and Mauritania detect and respond to a suspicious movement of people 
and assets within their borders through training, equipment, and cooperation. 
In 2005 it was substituted  by the “Trans-Saharian Counter-Terrorism” initiative, 
and in 2008 incorporated to AFRICOM.
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3 BRAZILIAN PERFORMANCE
Brazilian foreign trade depends, to a large extent, on the 
exportation of raw materials. In fact, commodities respond 
for almost half of the country’s exports. Minerals, as well as oil 
products and fuel, are the main export products. Because some of 
the largest Brazilian companies are specialized in the extraction of 
oil and mineral resources, most of the ones investing in Africa are 
also focused on that sector. Brazil benefits from expertise in the 
exploration of natural resources and from geological similarities 
with several countries in Africa. The National Bank for Economic 
and Social Development (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Econômico e Social - BNDES) helped finance these companies 
and they expanded their activities in Africa in the last decade, 
thus diversifying their production locations and increasing their 
international importance. 
The expansion of Brazilian presence in the South Atlantic 
occurs without tensions with neighboring countries. The challenge 
Brazil faces is not limited to the operation of its companies, but to 
the coordinated combination between dissuasion and cooperation 
as well. Regional integration will only bring results if common 
policies of defense and of military and economic cooperation 
are combined.  Recalling the 2005 UN Summit, at a time when 
the responsibility of each Member State to protect its population 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
mankind were stressed,  the Montevideo Declaration recognized 
in its text Brazil’s contribution, through the concept “Responsibility 
as Protection” as a complement to the concept “Responsibility to 
Protect”: 
[...] special attention must be given to the 
interdependence between security and 
development, as they mutually support 
each other and are fundamental to attain 
sustainable peace. We emphasize that many 
conflicts have a socio-economic component, 
that normally aggravates other ways that 
drive conflict. (ZOPACAS, 2013).
Within the scope of the ZOPACAS there are mechanisms 
established for multilateral cooperation in their action plans 
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(it is worth mentioning Montevideo, 2013) as a way to intensify 
the action  of the Member States. However, here we notice that 
bilateral cooperation prevails, leaving multilateralism in the 
background. Therefore, the projection of national interests are, to 
a great extent, the reason for Brazilian action in the inter-regional 
cooperation with Africa. 
[...] Brazilian foreign policy uses South-
South cooperation in an instrumental way, 
having the purpose of projecting Brazil’s 
influence abroad, of creating new economic 
opportunities and political partnerships, 
and of strenghtening national security 
through cooperation with less developed 
countries, considering even the defense area. 
(ABDENUR; NETO, 2014, p.217).
According to Miyamoto (2009) the presence of Brazil in 
the Community of Portuguese Language Speaking Countries 
(Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa - CPLP) may be 
viewed from two different perspectives:
[...] on one hand, in the use of it to 
project Brazilian interests abroad, that is, 
instrumentality done by the Brazilian foreign 
policy, aiming at maximizing the use of 
every possible existing resource, even the 
occupation of larger spaces than those of 
other countries along with the nations that 
are part of the community; on the other hand, 
it is also possible to infer that, despite the 
“pragmatism” of its foreign policy, Brazil is 
also thinking in terms of a joint action with 
CPLP in order to meet global interests that 
would not be possible to obtain individually. 
(MIYAMOTO, 2009, p. 33).
The active foreign policy practiced during the government of 
President Lula, who traveled in 12 occasions to 29 countries, was 
quite fruitful to a greater commitment of Brazil in relation to Africa. 
During the past decade, Brazil opened 19 out of the 37 embassies 
operating in Africa. Likewise, 18 of the 34 African embassies in 
Brasilia opened their doors over the same period. According 
to Visentini (2016), the climax in reaching closer links between 
Brazil and Africa occured from the beginning of President Lula’s 
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government on, through common interests in the struggle against 
poverty and epidemics, in the implementation of food security 
policies, and in technology transfer among Southern countries. 
Even though President Dilma Rousseff had significantly reduced 
some global commitments since 2011, cooperation in the scope 
of ZOPACAS was still a priority. The Brazilian Development Bank 
(Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento – BNDES), the Brazilian 
Cooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação - ABC) 
and the  Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Empresa 
Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - EMBRAPA) still maintain 
several investments in Senegal and Ghana. The opening of 
a BNDES Office in South Africa at the end of 2013 emphasized 
the importance that Brazil credits to regional cooperation. Brazil 
expanded its policies for  the development and technical support 
of the Portuguese-Speaking African Countries (Países Africanos 
de Língua Portuguesa - PALOP) during the last decade. In the 
military field, support for the training of the Namibia navy and the 
work of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de 
Cooperação – ABC) for military qualification in Cape Verde, São 
Tomé e Príncipe, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Benin, Nigeria and 
Angola were really significant.
In 2016, Brazil changed the direction of its foreign policy 
guidelines in relation to Africa. In the current Michel Temer’s 
government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under José 
Serra, requested a survey to assess the cost of the closing of 
diplomatic missions in the continent. In September 2016, the 
minister extinguished the Coordination General of Humanitarian 
Cooperation and Actions Against Hunger (Coordenadoria Geral 
de Cooperação Humanitária e Combate à Fome - CGFOME), an 
institution co-responsible for the international humanitarian 
cooperation to eradicate hunger and poverty, that used to fulfill 
an important role in the African continent. This sort of attitude 
befits the policy of the stripping of the South-South agenda and the 
guidelines of a foreign policy “without diplomatic grandstanding”. 
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4 CONCLUSION
Supranational regionalism has been one of the most important 
innovations in governance in recent years. As more and more 
challenges transcend the national borders, new and more 
sophisticated mechanisms of regional cooperation become 
necessary. Natural resources, energy, environmental degradation, 
disease control, migration, and military incursions are only a 
few examples of critical phenomena that do not respect national 
borders. The governance model centered on a hegemonic State is 
not capable of responding effectively to these dynamics.
The prominent role of Brazil at ZOPACAS has been maintained 
in recent years. There is a considerable effort from Brazil to 
consolidate its role as a leading player in a scenario that is full 
of contingencies. Regarding foreign affairs, the country faces 
persistent challenges to combine its interests in the South Atlantic 
with dissuasion to potential threats, besides leading alliances for 
a heterogeneous array of countries from the western coast of 
Africa. Internally, it faces the challenge of the dismantling of the 
foreign policy of the governments of Lula and Dilma, following 
the realignment to the global powers. The main argument is given 
in relation to austerity and containment of expenses, a situation 
caused by the economic crisis experienced by the country.
If the Member Countries of ZOPACAS think that it is necessary 
to secure non-intervention from extra regional players in order 
to provide a zone of peace and cooperation,  more than simple 
military cooperation is needed. The establishment of a peace 
zone without economic and diplomatic integration and technical 
cooperation may cause the opposite effect; it becomes quite 
attractive to extra regional powers. The role Brazil plays in South 
Atlantic integration takes into account the complexity that is 
inherent to this kind of initiative. Even though the challenges and 
the frailties are clearly exposed, the efforts are there to minimize 
the possibility of interference.
Nevertheless, there is the risk that the new guidelines for 
Brazilian foreign policy  in relation to African countries may 
weaken this tendency, because weaker commercial relations 
and cooperation from the largest Brazilian companies (especially 
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Petrobras and the major building contractors), involved in 
corruption scandals and investigated by the courts (Operação Lava 
Jato) may put in a tight spot Brazilian leadership and the existence 
of a zone of cooperation in the South Atlantic.
